Abstract. Verifiable random functions are pseudorandom functions producing publicly verifiable proofs for their outputs, allowing for efficient checks of the correctness of their computation. In this work, we introduce a new computational hypothesis, the n-Eigen-Value assumption, which can be seen as a relaxation of the U n -MDDH assumption, and prove its equivalence with the n-Rank assumption. Based on the newly introduced computational hypothesis, we build the core of a verifiable random function having an exponentially large input space and reaching adaptive security under a static assumption. The final construction achieves shorter public and secret keys compared to the existing schemes reaching the same properties.
accomplish (1) adaptive security [HW10] , (2) security under standard assumption [DY05] and (3) exponentially large input spaces [ACF09, HW10] . However, the realization of VRFs that simultaneously achieve these three requirements, but without having to rely on a q-type assumption has been proven a difficult task until the recent work of Hofheinz and Jager [HJ16] . The impeding constraint in achieving adaptive security resides in the lack of techniques for removing the q-type assumptions from the security proofs. As described by [Che06] , q-type assumptions get stronger with the increase of the parameter q. Recently, an interesting, lattice-based approach has been recently proposed in [Yam17] : although the computational hypothesis used is still not static, we point out the reduced sizes of the proofs and secret keys obtained in the constructions introduced in [Yam17] . This work targets VRFs under static assumptions using the framework introduced in [HJ16] .
The VRF by Hofheinz and Jager. The core of the construction by Hofheinz and Jager is inspired by the scheme introduced by Lysyanskaya in [Lys02] , where the output corresponding to x ∈ {0, 1} k is defined as y = g k i =1
a i ,x i . The novel technique presented in [HJ16] consists in replacing the set of (uniform) unidimensional exponents a i ,0/1 with matrix exponents. The crux point is to benefit from the algebraic properties enabled by the chain of matrix multiplications (linear maps in this case) in order to remove the need for q-type assumptions. The full realization of the VRF in [HJ16] involves an extra generic step of post-processing the vectorial output of the matrix construction via a final multiplication with a randomness extractor. The size of matrices and the issued proofs (proportional to the binary length of the input) constitutes the main downside of the construction introduced by Hofheinz and Jager. Therefore, an interesting open problems resides in obtaining constructions with shorter parameters or proofs.
Our contributions.
A first contribution is the introduction of a novel computational assumption (the n-Eigen-Value assumption), that we prove equivalent to the n-Rank assumption (Section 3). Informally, it states that given an encoding of a uniform n × n matrix having (at least) one eigenvalue in Z p , a computationally bounded adversary cannot distinguish between an encoding of its eigenvalue ([λ] := g λ ) and an encoding of a uniformly sampled element. Finally, we provide a VRF based on the framework introduced in [HJ16] and prove its adaptive security under the aforementioned assumption. In essence, we adopt the same methodology of obtaining the output through matrix multiplications. In terms of comparison with the previous construction, we are able to reduce the size of the keys, by eliminating n elements from each pair of n × n matrix needed. For efficient implementation over bilinear maps, where the dimension of the matrices is 3 × 3, the result translates in reducing the size of the secret and verification keys by a factor of one sixth.
Our technique. We give a brief overview of the proof technique we use and explain the difficulty encountered while attempting to reduce the dimensions of the matrix-based keys even with a constant factor. For brevity, consider a simplified version of our construction having the output generated as:
(M i −P i ,x i ) . The crucial property we want to achieve is a linear mapping between v ( j −1) = u · j −1 i =1
(M i −P i ,x i ) through the means of M j − P j ,x j . If v ( j −1) belongs to a pre-established subspace S j −1 , we intend to map it to S j by multiplication with M j − P j ,x j ; otherwise (v ( j −1) ∈ S j −1 ), the matrix multiplication should guarantee that v ( j ) ∈ S j . To ensure this, we consider an orthogonal component n⊥S j −1 and attempt to "hide" it in P j ,0 or P j ,1 (in fact in their difference depending on the challenge
The second idea that we will apply is to consider a representation of n where its last entry is 1; stated differently n = (α 1 , . . . , α n−1 , 1). Setting the last component to 1 enables us to save a row per index in the matrix construction we provide. In some sense, the main difficulty in going beyond one row elimination consists in the number of constant components we can obtain in n. The basic construction is presented in Section 4, while an adaptive construction is given in Section 5. Finally, we simply get the VRF through the generic transform introduced in [HJ16] (stated in Theorem 3, Appendix A.3).
Preliminaries
We denote by s $ ← S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S. Variables in bold capital letters stand for matrices (e.g. M) while bold lowercase letters represent vectors (e.g. u). A subscript i on a vector u (e.g. after multiplying the exponents and getting as a result the pairing of entries. By C (A), we denote the columnspace of a matrix A, and by C (A ), we denote its rowspace. We denote the security parameter by λ ∈ N and we assume it is given to all algorithms in the unary representation 1 λ . We regard an algorithm as being randomized (unless stated) and being modeled by stateless Turing machine. PPT as usual stands for "probabilistic polynomial-time." Given a randomized algorithm A we denote the action of running A on input(s) (1 λ , x 1 , . . .) with uniform random coins r and assigning the output(s) to (y 1 , . . .) by (y 1 , . . .)
We denote the set of all negligible functions by NEGL. Withx ≺ x, we denote a bitstring prefix.
Definitions
We recall the standard definition of a VRF and the novel notion of verifiable vector hash function from [HJ16] . Certified Bilinear Group Generators are presented in Appendix A.1. Moreover, we require the following three properties to hold:
Definition 1 (Verifiable Random Function
-Unique Provability: for any (vk, sk) (even maliciously generated) and any X ∈ {0, 1} k , there does not exist any
-Pseudorandomness: for any PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ), its advantage: and such that they satisfy the following two properties, termed correctness and unique provability:
-For correctness, we require that: 
We require that a VHF reaches selective/adaptive programmability with respect to trapdoor procedures (to be used in security proofs) as introduced in [HJ16] . We also denote them as PVHFs (programmable VHFs). The adaptive programmability is similar and is defined in Definition 4. 
Definition 3 (Selective Programmability
-Well-Distributed Outputs: for q = q(λ) a polynomial, there exists a polynomial poly such that for any
. . , q}, we have:
where β
n denotes the n-th component of β (i ) .
-Indistinguishability: for any PPT adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ), its advantage:
is negligible, where experiment SelTrapInd VHF is defined in Figure 1 . Intuitively, we require that verification keys generated using VHF.Gen are indistinguishable from those generated using VHF.TrapGen. 
Definition 4 (Adaptive Programmability
is negligible, where experiment SelTrapInd VHF is defined in Figure 1 .
The Eigen Value Assumption
In this section, we propose a new assumption, termed the n-Eigen-Value assumption, which we prove to be equivalent to the n-Rank assumption, whose definition is also recalled below. The purpose of this assumption is to offer more flexibility than the n-Rank assumption; we then use the n-Eigen-Value to prove the security of our construction (which then holds under the standard n-Rank assumption). Before giving the formal definition of our assumption, let us recall the definition of the n-Rank assumption in a group G:
Then the advantage of A against the n-Rank problem in a group G, defined as:
is negligible.
Remark 1 (Computational vs Decisional n-Rank).
Note that Definition 5 implicitly makes the n-Rank assumption "computational": distinguishing between the two ranks implicitly gives the rank of the matrix.
The natural n-Eigen-Value counterpart of the n-Rank assumption, roughly saying that
the encoding of an eigenvalue for a randomly sampled matrix M is indistinguishable from the encoding of a random element, needs a more careful definitional setting. This happens because not every M defined over Z n×n p has its eigenvalues belonging to Z p . Concretely, the (monic) characteristic polynomial of M is irreducible with probability:
For large p, µ approaches 1/n. Thus, the probability that a random matrix M has eigenvalues in Z p is simply 1−1/n. Still, practical applications would benefit for small values of n, and the aforementioned probability in Equation (5) is significant, so we employ a different strategy.
Based on the previous observation, we now define the n-Eigen-Value assumption as follows: let A, B be two matrices of ranks respectively n − 1, n, and L be randomly sampled from Z n×n p (which has rank n with overwhelming probability). We set M n−1 ← L · A + λ · I n and M n ← B. We now claim that the two distributions -
The advantage of any PPT adversary A against the n-Eigen-Value problem in a group G, defined as:
Theorem 1. The n-Rank assumption holds in G if and only if the n-Eigen-Value assumption holds in G.
Proof. We prove this statement by proving both implications separately.
n-Rank ⇒ n-Eigen-Value. Let A be an adversary against the n-Eigen-Value problem in G. We then build an adversary B against the n-Rank problem in G as follows: B is given a matrix of group elements [M] with M being of rank n −1 or n. It then picks uniformly at random an invertible matrix L Then, assuming M is a rank n matrix, Indeed, if λ is not an eigenvalue and M is uniformly sampled, M − λ · I n is just a uniform matrix in Z n×n p , which is then of rank n with overwhelming probability, and B simulates correctly the case where the input matrix for the n-Rank adversary has rank n. However, if λ is indeed an eigenvalue, then det(M − λ · I n ) = 0, which implies that M−λ·I n has rank at most n −1 (rank n −1 with overwhelming probability). In this case, B simulates the case where the input matrix to the n-Rank solver has rank n − 1.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
A new programmable vector hash function construction
Verifiable random functions can be build generically on top of programmable verifiable vector hash functions. We recall their transform allowing to obtain PVHF-based VRFs in Appendix A.3. In what follows, we contribute by introducing a new PVHF construction with smaller public and secret keys compared to the construction proposed in [HJ16] , and relying on a new technique.
A new PVHF construction
For e : G × G → G T a symmetric pairing with |G| = p (p prime), let D 0 and D 1 be the following "pattern" matrix distributions:
VHF.Gen(1
Return (vk, sk)
VHF.Eval(x, sk):
:
The underlying VHF construction, used to construct a selective PVHF for inputs of length k. We use the
We emphasize the representation size of P i ,0 , P i ,1 is n 2 -n, which translates in 6 elements for efficient construction using 3×3 matrices, thus obtaining a more efficient construction in terms of both public and secret keys when comparing to the one in [HJ16] .
Overview of the construction. We define a VHF construction in Figure 2 , show its correctness and unique provability, then introduce the trapdoor algorithms in Section 4.2 and prove programmability.
-The VHF.Gen algorithm of the proposed scheme generates a set of uniform matrices M j , P j ,0 ,
sampled according to the appropriate distributions. The set of "plain" matrices form the secret key sk, while the vk is set to be their encodings.
-The VHF.Eval procedure under sk, corresponding to x ∈ {0, 1} k outputs:
In some sense, our evaluation procedure is similar to the one described in [Lys02] , but we use a matrix multiplication construction rather than a unidimensional product.
-The VHF.Vfy procedure checks if all the pairings of (1) the vectors constituting the proof π, with (2) the matrices forming the public key, are correct.
Fine tunning the VHF to achieve well-distributed outputs. We also justify the need for uniform matrices corresponding to position k. Well-distributed outputs, as formulated in Definition 3 (Figure 1 ), enforces the last subspace (W ) we work to be the one spanned by the first n −1 canonical vectors. The reason for this constraint, resides in the proof for pseudorandomness: the outcome of the trapdoor evaluation is multiplied by a (n-LIN-distributedcf. [EHK + 13], page 9) matrix B . To cope with this subtlety, we "fine-tune" the PVHF, by doing the following change:
we replace the matrices in the last position M k , P k,0 , P k,1 with two "proper", random matrices M k,0 , M k,1 .
4.1.1 Correctness and unique provability. Correctness (1) follows immediately from the construction. Unique provability (2) follows from the deterministic evaluation. We prove it formally below: Lemma 1. The VHF construction presented in Figure 2 achieves 
The expanded equation shows the output values are uniquely determined by the secret key and the input string x, in a fully deterministic procedure. Hence, from Equation (6), it follows the unique provability property.
Proving Selective Programmability
As usual, provable security is achieved via a reduction to a computationally hard problem; in our case, we rely on the n-Eigen-Value assumption (detailed in Section . Then, given the k pairs of matrices
, the value u · M X (0) completely determines u (since M X (0) has full rank w.h.p.), whereas for any x = X (0) , M x is a matrix of rank n − 1 (because for some j,
has rank n − 1 and it's a term in the product represented by M x ), so u · M x loses information about u.
The trapdoor mode algorithms VHF.TrapGen and VHF.TrapEval are described below:
1. VHF.TrapGen sets all the matrices (M j , P j ,0 , P j ,1 ) such that:
-it first generates, uniformly at random, a subspace of dimension n − 1, denoted S 0 and a uniform u $ ← Z n p , which with overwhelming probability will not belong to S 0 .
-it incrementally constructs the challenge-related matrices such that M j − P j ,1−X (0) defines a rowspace of rank n − 1, denoted S j . Also, M j − P j ,X (0) defines a linear map between the subspaces S j −1 and S j ; formally
Achieving the linear map property is more subtle, and requires a careful programming of the matrices
such that its rowspace defines S j . A normal vector (α 1 , . . . , α n−1 , 1), orthogonal on S j −1 is also computed. Finally the matrices can be set as in Figure 3: The intuition behind this setting is given by the orthogonal component. The value of the inner product between v ( j −1) and the orthogonal component on S j −1 will enable/disable the membership of v ( j ) to S j : a zero inner product means that
where W is the subspace spanned by the first n-1 vectors from the canonical basis.
2. VHF.TrapEval behaves exactly as the VHF.Eval with the noticeable difference, that for a trapdoor algorithm, the resulting vector is multiplied with the matrix B, as specified in Figure 1 .
We now prove well-distributed outputs and indistinguishability. Fig. 3 : Matrices M j , P j ,0 , P j ,1 for j ∈ [k-1] generated for the trapdoor mode. The matrices M k,0 , M k,1 are generated as in [HJ16] .
Well-distributed outputs
Lemma 2. The PVHF construction presented in Figure 2 has well-distributed outputs according to Definition 3.
Proof. The triple M j , P j ,0 , P j ,1 j ∈[k−1] -as defined in Figure 3 -can be used to construct matrices with the properties enumerated below:
where N is the zero matrix except the last column being set to α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n−1 , 1 . (A detailed proof is worked out in Appendix B).
Property M
An invariant is used to easily encapsulate the well-distributed outputs property:
where C S j = S j .
We demonstrate the invariant is preserved under the setting of matrices shown in Figure 3 by proving a set of simple lemmata. Essentially, the first one ensures that
The second and third lemmas state that M j − P j ,X (0) j will map vectors from S j −1 → S j for j ∈ [k-1]. Full proofs are given in Appendix C.
Finally, care is needed because the special way of sampling M k,0 and M k,1 . Their trapdoor form is given in Figure 3 and the argument for linear maps is the one we mentioned before. Moreover, according to the Definition 3, one needs to ensure that S k = W , which implies a special form for S k used to instantiate M k,0 , k,1 . Finally, the invariant immediately follows from the lemmas, and therefore we obtain well-distributed outputs for the construction in 
VHF.Gen(Π):
Eval 1 (x): 
Proof (Lemma 6). We prove an adversary cannot detect the transition between Game j and Game j +1 , via the intermediate sub-hybrid game we have introduced. The transition between Game j and Game j ,A relies on a statistical argument. In Game j , the tuple M j +1 , P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 corresponding to the position j +1 are sampled uniformly from Z n×n p ×D 0 ×D 1 . In Game j ,A , we sample the matrices in position j +1 using the trapdoor distribution. The indistinguishability follows from the fact that in Game j ,A (Figure 5 ) , all the entries in P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 are sampled uniformly at random; observe the entries in the last columns of P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 consists in the sum (difference) of randomly sampled r i ,n + α i . Thus, the orthogonality components α 1 , . . . , α n−1 , 1 are indistinguishable from uniform elements, which implies that Pr Game
Lemma 7. For j ∈ [k-2], a PPT adversary distinguishes between Game j ,A and Game j +1 with negligible advantage:
Proof (Lemma 7)
. One can observe that our trapdoor construction differs from the one introduced in [HJ16] in the sense that instead of using two matrices, we use a matrix and two vectors (when n = 3), in a sense aiming to compress as much info as possible in the two row vectors.
Reduction to the n-Eigen-Value assumption. We take the contrapositive. Let A be a PPT adversary having a nonnegligible advantage in distinguishing between Game j ,A and Game j +1 . We build an adversary A that wins the n-Eigen-Value game with the same probability. The n-Eigen-Value game commences by sampling a bit b . A is 
as in the G ame j ,A . We embed the challenge in M j +1 , P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 as depicted in Figure 3 . -A is able to construct the evaluation oracle, given that it knows the values of the matrices used, except the ones corresponding to index j +1 (which are encoded). This means that A is be able to interact with the evaluation oracle.
Correctness of the simulation:
-if e b is an eigenvalue for A, then the matrices M j +1 , P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 are distributed as in Game j +1 .
-if e b is not an eigenvalue for A, but a uniformly sampled element from Z p , the matrices are distributed exactly as in Game j ,A , the argument relying on the fact that (A − e b · I n ) is a full rank matrix: 
The reduction algorithm used in the proof of Lemma 7.
is indistinguishable from its equivalent from Game j ,A , due to the fact that (s
1,n ) are uniform elements.
-
is indistinguishable from its equivalent from Game j ,A , due to the fact that {s i , j } are uniform elements.
. We argue for pseudorandomness based on the fact that L j +1 is a uniformly sampled matrix which randomizes the left side, and the result of the multiplication with the full rank matrix A − e b · I n is also uniform. Thus M j +1 is a uniform matrix if e b is not an eigenvalue for A. -Finally, if the adversary A can distinguish the way M j , P j +1,0 , P j +1,1 were set up, based on A and e b , then it can break the n-Eigen-Value assumption.
Hence, the advantage of an adversary distinguishing between Game 0 and Game k−1 is bounded by:
Final games. In Game k we change the setup for M k,0 , M k,1 . We rely on the same technique as in [HJ16] : given a The final transition, from Game k → Game k+1 , consists in embedding B (Definition 3) in M k,0 and M k,1 . This is done by setting S k as W and multiplying the resulting M k,0 , M k,1 with a uniformly sampled B, which guarantees indistinguishability from random. B is to be used in Theorem 3 to embed the n-Lin assumption and prove the pseudorandomness of the final (generic) VRF construction. Thus:
Finally, this completes the proof of Theorem 2, and shows the VHF is selectively programmable. Adaptive programmability is similar and shown in Section 5.
Adaptive programmable PVHFs
The adaptive PVHF is obtained on top of the selective one defined in Figure 2 , with the additional change that we make use of an admissible hash function AHF (Definition 8, Appendix A.2). AHFs, introduced in [BB04] , and utilized in [CHKP10,AFL12], are useful tools for doing the "jump" from selective to adaptive security. In terms of the PVHF construction introduced in Section 4.1, the main change consists in hashing the inputs via an AHF. The resulting strings are used to feed the VHF.Eval,VHF.TrapEval algorithms defined for the PVHF. A partial change consists in the form of the matrices corresponding to positions for which K AHF = .
VHF.TrapGen([B],1 λ ): The process of sampling the trapdoor keys (t d , vk) depends on the key K AHF , and is done as follows:
1. If K AHF,j ∈ {0, 1}, then the matrices M j , P j ,0 , P j ,1 are set as in the selective case (Figure 3 ). 2. If K AHF,j = , a more careful instantiation is required. If this is the case, we want that both M j − P j ,0 and M j − P j ,1 to map vectors between S j −1 and S j . For this to happen, an adaptive VHF.TrapGen will sample the matrices as follows: Fig. 8 : Matrices M j , P j ,0 , P j ,1 corresponding to K AHF,j = . For the case where K AHF,j = , the matrices are sampled as in Figure 3 . Here, L j and L j are uniform (n −1)×(n −1) matrices and δ $ ← Z p , the first n −1 rows in C j are sampled from S j −1 ; r x,y denotes a random element in Z p .
1 n/p is the probability that a matrix sampled uniformly at random in Z n×n p is singular. Figure 7 yields an adaptive secure PVHF. To motivate indistinguishability for K AHF,j = , observe that both C j and C j are full rank matrices, and the elements in C j are uniformly sampled (S j being a uniform subspace), thus C j acting as a randomness extractor. This randomizes M j . We also have to show that no computational adversary can distinguish P j ,0 and P j ,1 (thus D 
Lemma 8. The construction defined in

Proof (Lemma 8). Correctness
−
A.2 Admissible Hash Functions
We define admissible hash functions as follows.
Definition 8 (Admissible Hash Functions). For a function AHF : {0, 1}
k → {0, 1} AHF , and K ∈ {0, 1, } AHF , we define the function F K : {0, 1}
k → {CO, UN}:
We say that AHF is q-admissible if there exist a PPT algorithm KeyGen and a polynomial poly such that for all X (0) , X (1) , . . . , X (q) with X (0) ∈ {X (i ) } i =1,...,q , we have:
where the probability is over K $ ← KeyGen(1 λ ). We further say that AHF is an admissible hash function is AHF is q-admissible for any polynomial q = q(λ).
A.3 Generic constructions of VRF on top of PVHFs
We state the generic transform of a VRF defined on top of a PVHF. It post-processes the output of the PVHF as by multiplication with a vector acting as a randomness extractor, and adding relevant components to the proof generated by the PVHF.
Theorem 3 (Hofheinz and Jager [HJ16]).
Given an adaptive (selective) secure PVHF, the construction depicted in Figure 9 yields an adaptive (selective) secure VRF under the n − LIN assumption. 
B Proof of well-distributed outputs
We prove that M j − P j ,X (0) = L j · S j s j · S j + (−1)
i N, where the matrices are defined in Figure 3 and N is the n × n zero matrix, except the last column being set to α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n−1 , 1 .
